Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: International relations theory in recent years has witnessed a wide-ranging debate between rationalist and constructivist approaches to strategic action. Much of international relations theory has been premised on the assumption of rational action, with actors pursuing an instrumental logic (Elster 1989). Other work has focused on the effect of normative rules in constraining behavior, with actors pursuing a logic of appropriateness (March and Simon 1998; Finnemore 1996, Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink 1999). Recent work in international relations theory (Risse 2000, Checkel 2001) has suggested that actors employ a third mode of argumentative behavior, based on the logic of communicative action (Habermas 1984). My paper investigates the extent to which these different three modes of action have been at play in democratic Russia's debates about strategic arms control. I suggest new ways of establishing which mode actors are likely to employ. I argue that by operationalizing the concepts of uncertainty, history, and rationality, we can more concretely specify the conditions under which actors are most likely to act instrumentally, follow rules of appropriate behavior, engage in communicative action, and switch between modes. I demonstrate this argument through an analysis of how democratic Russia has defined its national interest in strategic arms control and missile defense with regard to the United States. The Russian elite over the much of the post-Soviet period has coalesced around a definition of Russia's core interest as maintenance of its great power status, and has based its current position on its past status to determine its approach to arms control issues. From 1994-2000, elite reliance on logic of appropriateness prevented the Russian state from rationally learning from its weakness to secure arms control agreements and decreased Russia's ability to engage the US on these issues. A democratic developmentalist segment of the elite has consistently employed the mode of communicative action to undermine consensus on Russia's great power status, arguing in the language of Western rationalism for regarding Russia as a regional power rather than a global one. They have gradually reduced the Russian elite's uncertainty about its strategic security environment and its new democratic structure and undermined action based on the appropriateness of Russia's great power status. The result since 2001 has been a change from Russia's pursuit of status to a more rational evaluation of costs and benefits in strategic arms control. Constructivist and game theoretic approaches that rely on the logic of reciprocity suggest that states form their identities and their security interests (Wendt, 1999) or their strategies (Axelrod, 1984) by mirroring the behavior of other states. My approach highlights the fact that when the logic of appropriateness reigns, Russia's interests in strategic arms control is defined as much by its image of its past self as by the past actions of other states. It also specifies the mechanisms through which the standards of appropriateness can be undermined through communicative action, ironically producing a much more rational discourse regarding security interests.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Scholars of consumer behavior found that people’s decisions are often dependent on the set of options in the choice set. Certain options become more likely to be chosen in the presence of other alternatives. One primary cause of menu-dependent choice behavior is the difficulty of the choice. When a decision is difficult, people will take steps to reduce the amount of difficulty associated with the choice. These decision-makers become more likely to choose options that make the decision easier to justify (Simonson 1989) or reduce the level of anxiety associated with the choice (Pettibone and Wedell 2000). I present evidence from an experiment that investigates how changing the menu of possible answers influences choice difficulty and choice invariance.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We show that the partitional equilibrium structure in the
Crawford-Sobel model changes if a Sender with monopoly agenda
setting power has the status quo as an outside option. We do this
by proving that, in contrast to the deviation-based equilibrium
refinement commonly used, the status quo serves as an
informational refinement. In turn, we demonstrate that if monopoly
agenda setting power is given to an informed Sender, the cycling
problem is solved--overcoming the emph{Stiglitz critique}--an
equilibrium outcome that is better for both players is produced,
and more informationally efficient equilibria are yielded. We discuss some implications of our result on legislative politics.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ABSTRACT
This paper explores why financial decentralization and political pressure to lower graduated personal tax has had different impacts in two Ugandan districts. It examines three possible explanations to these differences focusing on different aspects of the local context. The quid-pro-quo explanation focuses on whether services are delivered in return for the tax paid. Different perceived service delivery levels would then explain differences in compliance and tax takes. The neo-patrimonial explanation argues that differences in the degree to which personal relations dominate over formal rules would explain the differences in tax takes. The extractive capacity explanation focuses on established practices with regard to tax collection and stresses the fact that administrative autonomy differ among districts. The paper argues that the latter explanation is most plausible.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In trying to grasp the mode of international security as it stands today, operations of Private Military/Security Companies (PMCs/PSCs) and outsourcing of security as such highlight important changes impacting international society.

On the one hand, one can observe the privatization of the military of the United States at its height attracting both amazement and suspicion: on the other hand, one sees the private security sector in the United Kingdom shifting towards post-Iraq reconstruction and international development.

This paper explores how PSCs seek new relations in international community especially in their relation to the non-profit development sector, while distinguishing themselves from the more belligerent US model. Reference will be made to the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), peacekeeping training and PMSCs, as well as current developments observed in Japan.