Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ABSTRACT
This paper explores why financial decentralization and political pressure to lower graduated personal tax has had different impacts in two Ugandan districts. It examines three possible explanations to these differences focusing on different aspects of the local context. The quid-pro-quo explanation focuses on whether services are delivered in return for the tax paid. Different perceived service delivery levels would then explain differences in compliance and tax takes. The neo-patrimonial explanation argues that differences in the degree to which personal relations dominate over formal rules would explain the differences in tax takes. The extractive capacity explanation focuses on established practices with regard to tax collection and stresses the fact that administrative autonomy differ among districts. The paper argues that the latter explanation is most plausible.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Focusing on the phenomenon of self-raised revenue, this paper examines the strategies and implications of taxless administrative financing in local China, drawing upon statistical data and interviews. My central argument is that taxless administrative financing illuminates a particular scheme of public finance in which the state exchanges privileges for revenue. What is analytically noteworthy about the case of contemporary China is that such privileges are “sold” to public agencies and service providers to finance a part of their administrative expenditure, and not to private contractors, as it was done in early and pre-modern societies. Two important implications stand out. First, I emphasize that bureaucracies actively pursue state legitimation for avenues of revenue-generation. This behavior is distinct from arbitrary fee-taking and corruption. Second, I highlight that the institution of (partially or fully) self-funded administration reflects a peculiar mixture of a modern salaried civil service with pre-modern tax farming practices. This observation poses a fundamental puzzle of state organization in China.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In recent years there has been burgeoning scholarly and policy attention for the role of natural resources in armed conflict. Previous studies have demonstrated that the illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources has financed rebel activities all

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In recent years, growing interest has been shown toward the identification of political and economic determinants of Canadian provincial public expenditures and deficits. Public revenues on the other hand have received much less attention. The objective of our paper is to address this issue. We will undertake a cross-sectional time series empirical analysis of revenue variations observed in the ten Canadian provinces. We test a number of hypotheses, including the effect of partisan and the electoral cycles, globalization, demographic structure, public debt and federal transfers. We examine total revenues as well as taxes levied on personal and corporate income and consumption taxes. Our analysis covers the 1965-2003 period. We find support for the partisan and electoral hypotheses as well as the impact of federal transfers, but mixed results for the effect of globalization and demographic needs. We find no evidence that the public debt influences public revenues variations. Our results also show that the influence of some explanations is not constant over time.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The political budget cycle hypothesis suggests that elected officials run deficits in election years
by reducing revenues and increasing spending to provide maximum benefits to voters at
minimal costs. How might this work in political jurisdictions required by law to balance their
budgets? I examine this question with panel data on 58 U.S. cities for the period 1970 to 1992.
I argue that one way for local elected officials to accomplish something comparable to a
political budget is to reduce own source revenue and increase intergovernmental revenue
during election years. In this way they can provide the electoral benefit of smaller local
government without necessarily having to impose cuts in local services. Regression results
indicate support for the theory: per capita own source revenues decline during fiscal years in
which elections are held while per capita federal and state revenues increase.