Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to understand the dynamics behind the revolutionary character of Shiism, which is considered to be one of the most anti-status quo sects within Islam.Contrary to the essentialist arguments that some religions are more prone to revolutionary dynamics due to their theological backgrounds, we argue that there are environmental factors such as socio-economic dynamics within the country and the international political context that serve as better tools in understanding the revolutionary tendencies of religions. We analyze Shiism in Iran and make a comparative analysis between Shiism before the Shah regime and Shiism after the Shah regime. This comparison provides a valuable opportunity to grasp the real dynamics behind the revolutionary character of religion in general and Shiism in particular and challenge the Marxist argument that religion is the opium of masses by showing that religions can be used as powerful opposition strategies.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper I note that the Declaration of Independence is one of several revolutionary Protestant political manifestos, and I examine the document in this context.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This study will use varieties of comupter techniques to analyze revolutionary forces around the globe. The conclusion will explain the outcome of revolution for each national revolutionary group.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I am using a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In particular, in Iranian politics it is both the ideological conservative faction’s occupation of key positions within the constitution and their pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic’s socialization to regional and international politics.
Most parts of the Iranian polity have been revolutionary rhetorically but pragmatic in most actions and thus aim at accommodation. Nevertheless, a powerful part has indulged in the obstruction of this policy emerging after 1988. Crucially, this constituency only – revolutionary in words and deeds – is of interest here. Therefore, the article tests how the ideological conservative faction in Iran has prevented Iran’s socialization to the international system.
Regarding Iran, I define revolutionary behavior as the direct outcomes of an unchanged and uncompromising belief (of the radical conservative and fundamentalist factions only) in the illegitimacy of international institutions and the prevailing international system in general. It is precisely this attitude which is reflected in the aforementioned factions’ regular dismissal of actions taken by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘World arrogance’ is the term which has been used by these factions since 1979 to mark any of these proceedings. As a matter of fact, these are thinly veiled attacks both on the role of the United States in world politics and, critically, on those moderate Iranian factions which strive for cooperation with the US. Their active support for terrorist groups both in Lebanon (since 1982) and Palestine also underlines this “revolutionary” approach.
It is crucial at this point to give Iran’s domestic power structure, with its respective factions, the appropriate weight. While it is tempting to think that if the regime changed its behavior but not its belief, one could label it non-revolutionary, this pragmatic move fails to understand both the factional splits, and related to that, the unequal distribution of power between the elected and the non-elected governing bodies. Put briefly, the election of a moderate president and his faction would change the international behavior of Iran’s democratic government; however, this would not affect the conservatives’ belief and hence their constant attempts at undermining the foreign policy efforts of the moderate forces. Above all, they are equipped with a degree of political power which allows them to counter the elected bodies at any time. Thus, despite moderating influences in Iran’s foreign policy, the revolutionary label appears to be correct.
Lastly, realism correctly reminds us that many states violate norms, laws and common expectations about state behavior, and indeed they are not labeled revolutionary. Nonetheless, the distinguishing criterion between those states and Iran remains evident. While the moderate factions have tried to change Iran’s foreign policy over the years, their attempts have constantly been derailed by their powerful opponents in the long run. Thus, the revolutionary attitude of the latter ones has continued to be unchanged and uncompromising over the last twenty years. It is the relentless endurance of this belief, reflected in the conservative and fundamentalist factions’ foreign policy behavior being constantly directed against the foundations of the international system, which makes revolutionary behavior distinct.
In contrast, socialized behavior as displayed at various times by the moderates in Iran’s foreign policy is exercised by states which are inclined to uphold and sustain the arrangements of the international system. This does not preclude the aforementioned violations subsumed under realism.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Political psychology has studied mass political beliefs largely in terms of the individual differences found to accompany adherents of culturally deviant beliefs (Sidanius, 1985, 1988) or of a set of mutual conflicting beliefs (Tetlock, 1986, 2004). Yet to be explored are the consequences for the individual of the perception of incongruity in beliefs: either the incongruity between one's own beliefs and those dominant in one's cultural context, or between two or more inconsistent beliefs held by the same individual. An empirical study was designed to observe the implications of the experience of such inconsistency in the case of adherents of revolutionary socialist beliefs. Utilising the premises that 1) political beliefs are deemed "radical" if they go against "culturally mainstream" beliefs, and 2) the latter mainstream beliefs are partly based on assumptions about human nature which are held by all individuals in any socio-cultural context, it is claimed that adherents of radical political beliefs hold at least two sets of beliefs, which are implicitly consistent to a certain degree. Novel methodological tools, designed to detect and make salient such inconsistencies, lead to the observation of strategies for responding to perceived inconsistency, which can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Political psychological models are evaluated in the light of the findings, alongside a potential framework relating to the interaction between cognition and culture. An argument is made for the expansion of the current study of political beliefs, in a manner which takes unto account current research in social psychology, and yet is sensitive to both cognitive and discursive approaches.