Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: One of the central findings of the literature on economic sanctions is that successful sanctions threats are those that do not result in the actual imposition of sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, Bayard and Elliott 1994, Elliott and Richardson 1997, Drezner 1999, Drezner 2002, Marinov 2003). When sanctions are imposed, this shows the failure of the threat of imposition of sanction to change the behavior of the target. However, this literature does not provide us with either (a) convincing empirical tests of the observable implications of the theory it advances, or (b) a methodology for how one might go about and test its claims. In this paper I test the claims of the economic sanctions literature by focusing on the use of Special 301 sanctions threats as a mechanism for forcing countries to provide better protection for intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, I not only differentiate between instances of imposition of Special 301 sanctions and instances of threats to impose sanctions, but also develop a methodology for coding the severity of Special 301 sanctions threats. In particular, if the literature is correct, we would expect that higher sanctions threats (short of the imposition of actual sanctions) would lead to bigger changes in the behavior of the target state. I use two sources of data. First, I use my own large N dataset on the IPR enforcement record of 33 countries in the year 2000; my dataset shows that higher sanctions threats lead to lower enforcement of IPR laws, a result that directly contradicts the claims of the sanctions literature. Second, I use time-series data for five countries (China, Czech Republic, France, Russia, and Taiwan) for the 1989-2002; through those time-series data I show that (a) Special 301 sanctions threats are used haphazardly by the US, and (b) Special 301 sanctions threats have no positive impact on IPR protection in those five countries. Thus, my research tests the observable implications of the economic sanctions literature and casts serious doubts on their validity. I then propose an explanation highlighting why Special 301 sanctions threats are not credible for most countries that become their targets. Therefore, I suggest that the claims of the economics sanctions literature need to be revised in light of the empirical evidence my research offers.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Although most studies agree that the economic sanction will decrease FDI inflows in the target states, I wonder why some target states experience more FDI during the sanction. This study refutes the casual theoretical claim that economic sanctions always have a negative impact for FDI in the target countries. Instead, this study argues that economic sanction can actually increase FDI in certain conditions. Especially, I see that unexpected sanctions increase FDI in the target countries because they will observe any change in both economic and political status ex post while in certainly expected economic sanction, firms will cancel their plan or completely stop all forms of investment in the target countries. In addition, economic, financial, and political stability in the target could attract FDI although they have been sanctioned. I find that unexpected sanctions in the target increase FDI. I also confirm that healthy macroeconomic policy and higher political stability in the target countries attract more FDI although they are engaged in the economic sanction. Thus, MNCs are rational profit-maximizer, and they tend to invest to the countries that the future growth is expected, regardless of the economic sanction.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The literature on economic sanctions is dominated by studies that focus on domestic and system level determinants of sanction effectiveness. A neglected area of study is the impact of issue salience on the use and effectiveness of sanctions. Some studies have emphasized the importance of issues under dispute (Li, 1993; Lindsay, 1986; Drezner, 2003; Lacy and Niou, 2004), but these studies have not considered the strategic interaction process from the perspective of both the target and sender states. Further, these studies have focused on issue-linkage politics rather than issue salience. The paper argues that focusing on issue salience permits a more complete understanding of state behavior: Specifically, the perception of high issue salience by the sender state will result in the imposition of sanctions and the determination to see them succeed. Similarly, the perception of high issue salience by target states will increase the level of resistance to the sender state's demands and increase the probability that sanctions will fail. The paper demonstrates how the asymmetric perception of issue salience by one or both sides contributes to the success or failure of economic sanctions, depending on the direction of the asymmetry.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The traditional sanctions literature, as well as the emerging literature on targeted sanctions, treat sanctions episodes as integrated units of observation. The sanctions regime is their main focus. This approach is particularly reflected in classical studies such as Economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy (Hufbauer, et. Al. 1985), as well as in more recent work such as The Sanctions Decade (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). In contrast to this conventional view, I argue that the sanction regime has to be disaggregated in order to get a better understanding of the impact of targeted sanctions. It is no longer possible to evaluate the success or failure of sanctions regimes by only taking into account a sanctions regime from the day it starts to the day it is being terminated. On the contrary, in each sanction regimes there are in fact several sanctions episodes, defined on the basis of the targeting dynamics which later sanctions regimes do. This paper thus provides a new approach on how to further segment sanctions regime studies, and the broader theoretical implication this has on sanctions studies. Moreover, this paper will present new data on how to better understand the dynamics of individual targeting, which is a core attribute in the shift from comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions. My goal is to provide a better understanding of the role targeted sanctions can play as a strategy for achieving behavioral change.