Publication Type: Invited Paper
Abstract: With the growing use of electronic forms of communication by students and faculty, this paper examines the effect of that electronic communication style. At a time when the face of the student and the face of the activity are given greater importance, the electronic medium allows and encourages a variety of communication styles. There may also be a number of communication effects and outcomes that are counterproductive. Numerous interpersonal communication strategies may be at work, many without the knowledge or control of those involved in the activity. The long-term effect of these communications can be detrimental to the continuation of students� participation within the group.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The resurgence of interest in culture animates several IR traditions. Feminist analyses took up issues of gender and culture in various geospaces and forms. Postcolonial analyses have challenged the Huntingtonian clash thesis, as well as neorealist and neoliberal IR, for missing the way international society forms a competition of cultures. Yet in the midst of considerable talk about culture and international relations, the ways various nation-states use the realm of art to struggle with each other for identity, prestige, and history largely escapes IR's notice. This paper provides two instances of endeavouring to save, conserve, preserve, or secure something about a nation by saving artworks displayed in museums. The first case highlights the struggle between the National Gallery of London and the Getty Museum over possession of Raphael's "Madonna of the Pinks." The second case concerns the large-scale international effort to save bits of Iraq by saving art and artifacts looted during the recent war. The exploration reminds us that art institutions can be subjects and agents of international relations.

Publication Type: Presentation Proposal
Abstract: This hands-on workshop will provide tools that will help teachers and students learn how to improve the energy efficiency of their school. Measures that will not only save energy, but will reduce a schools utility costs and conserve natural resources.

Publication Type: Poster
Abstract: Thomas Lindemann, professor of political science (University Montesquieu Bordeaux IV)Saving face, saving peace. The politics of recognition in international crises Not all wars are premeditated or the result of anonym power structures. One can reasonably argue that a great number of interstate wars are inadverted (A. George) and triggered by what actors concretely do in the interactions with others in an international crises. The literature of international crises management is steadily growing. One can distinguish two perspectives which draw heavily on rational choice theory. For one school of thought, decision-makers should increase the cost of aggression via a deterrence policy (negative sanctions). For the other school, decision makers should try to increase the reward for a peaceful policy via positive sanctions (via economic inducements). In our opinion the impact of positive and negative sanctions should be assessed regarding both, well-being and physical security on the one hand and self esteem and self image of the actors on the other hand. For emotional and cognitive reasons injuries (perceived or real) to the moral integrity and identity could trigger aggressiveness. Therefore we defend the thesis that peaceful management of international crises depends heavily on the capacity of the actors to engage in a kind of politics of recognition which confirms universal and more specific identity claims. Our analysis is inspired by sociological and philosophical works about “recognition” (C. Taylor, A. Honneth) and tries to apply them to the study of international crises. We have chosen four international crises for our demonstration : two of the crises resulted in war (the israelo-egyptian crisis which preceded the Six Days War 1967, the crisis between the USA and Iraq 2001-2003), while the two other ones have been peacefully resolved (the Cuban missile crisis 1962 and the crisis between Libya –USA 1986-2004). The first of the two crises were also not inevitably “programmed“ for war (like the justification of hostility crises identified by R. Lebow) at least not in its initial phase (the war option against Iraq favoured by American neoconservatives were in September 2001 in a minority position).In our interpretation of the crisis we will assess if this variation of outcome is associated to the variation of our independent variable: the politics of recognition. A recognition policy in crisis means firstly to respect the “positive” and “negative face” of the adversary (E. Goffman). Concretely this means to avoid public intimidation, threats, ultimatums and rhetorical depreciation. More positively it implies to associate the adversary in a dialogue of equal partners (like Kennedy did with Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis) and to make some symbolic or material concessions to save the others face (for example Kennedy recognized the territorial integrity of Cuba and conceded the retreat of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey). More specific recognition policies are also important for the peaceful outcome of international crises like the respect of values, cultures and historical experiences of others states (in this case the denigration of the Holocaust trauma by Egyptians decision makers in 1967 was particularly fateful). Another important and somehow neglected aspect of recognition is the “affective” dimension. The lack of empathy, the displaying of indifference (like Saddam Hussein’s commentary after 11/9) or purely “instrumental” and distorted communication can be a powerful fuel for moral indignation and the feeling for humiliation and therefore provide a powerful motive for war.The goal of the paper is to introduce the symbolic dimension of international crises management and to show that pure deterrence (like the intimidation of the Melians by the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war) must often fail because of the high psychological cost of unconditional submission.