Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Ohio conducted a pilot of the Surveys of Enacted Curriculum (SEC) to analyze the effects of standards-based education reform. This paper is a first look at the results from Ohio including findings and a blueprint for a systematic, long-term study.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines whether the ideological composition of the federal courts influences U.S. bureaucratic decision making when the decisions relate to policy that helps define the mission of the agency and the decision making process includes substantive input from the highest levels of the bureaucracy. It also suggests other potential influences on bureaucratic decision making that may be more important than the ideology of the courts under these conditions. An extensive, original data set was developed to perform the analysis. The paper utilizes this data to test the hypothesis that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers the ideological composition of the federal courts when making strategic decisions about whether to file enforcement actions against defendants in federal court or through administrative proceedings before an administrative law judge. It attempts to determine whether the SEC, in general, is less likely to bring an enforcement action in federal court, and will opt for an administrative proceeding, when the ideological composition of the court that has jurisdiction is conservative and more likely to initiate a proceeding in court when the composition of the court that has jurisdiction is liberal. The paper further analyzes whether these dynamics may change when the political party that (i) holds the majority of SEC seats and/or (ii) controls the presidency changes - to determine whether a change in the ideology of an administration affects the way the SEC perceives the ideology of the federal courts and, as a consequence, makes its decisions.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explores the unknown history of the role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in establishing what might be called mini-Secs across the globe. Since the late 1940s when the U.S. began providing massive aid to Europe and developing countries as part of the Cold War, SEC personnel became Cold War warriors, fanning out across the globe, hoping to create U.S. style markets and U.S. style market regulation in places as far flung as Pakistan and Brazil. Continually, the SEC asserted to both developed and developing nations that U.S. style securities regulation was the best and most efficient. These programs were often tied to other types of economic and military aid. The SEC's attitude reflected both a particular type of American exceptionalism as well as the desire to create global financial markets which would benefit U.S. markets. Further at times, the SEC pointed to its international programs as evidence of the success of U.S. securities regulation when the SEC's own domestic reputation was on the wane. When the Berlin Wall fell, the SEC recognizing an enormous opportunity, aggressively reached out to Eastern Bloc countries and Eastern Bloc lawyers with a wide range of programs and technical assistance regarding the creation of regulated markets. Its newly established International Institute for Securities Enforcement trained literally hundreds of foreign government lawyers while simultaneously increasing the international power of the SEC. Where scholars and SEC personal have explained the adoption by foreign countries of U.S. style securities regulation and laws as the result of it being the most efficient system, this paper demonstrates that the U.S. intentionally promoted and funded such programs as an explicit part of U.S. foreign policy and adopted a carrot and stick approach to entice foreign governments to participate.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Although isolated studies find private prisons save governments money when compared to public institutions, most studies costs differences that are negligible. While research focuses on better methodology to compare institutions and costs, this research takes a different tact by examining the assumption that business is more efficient than government. Specifically, private prisons that are traded on the stock exchange file regular reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission that give insight into business expenditures that governments do not have or do more cheaply. For example, the 2005 pay for the CEO of the Corrections Corporation of America was $1.4 million; Board members in 2006 were paid a $50,000 retainer plus compensation for each meeting; issuance of new stock, refinancing and recapitalization; insurance; shareholder lawsuits; advertising, customer acquisition and contract writing; shareholder relations; lobbying; fees for mergers and acquisitions; and legal fees for SEC filings and work.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this article, I argue that modern-day regulation of the U.S. stock market depends on sophisticated investors and that this delegation of responsibility places too much faith in the beneficent impact of this group. I suggest that although relying on sophisticates may represent the best choice among imperfect regulatory alternatives, it nevertheless offers a rather thin layer of investor protection. As a result, we need to adjust our expectations of both their role in the stock market and the safety of publicly-traded securities in general accordingly.