Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat three variations of the game – the complete information game, the one-sided information game, and the two-sided information game. We employ sequential decision theory to analyze the games of incomplete information. Specifically, we examine the behavior of Challenger first using a von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule and then compare that to Challenger’s behavior under a Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. The formal results show that given the right combination of outcome valuations and probability values and weightings, a Challenger employing the Kahneman-Tversky decision rule will make choices that are reversed from those made under the von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule. We also claim that these reversals in Challenger’s behavior occur in the game of two-sided incomplete information. In the application section, we illustrate the explanatory power of these models via analyses of the 2003 US-Iraq War.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Various explanations have been offered for the success of the Door-In-The-Face (DITF) sequential request strategy. This document provides a synthesis of the DITF findings and argues that the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provides a theoretical framework for explaining DITF findings. To explore that possibility, participants (N=492) were asked to respond to a questionnaire assessing TPB constructs regarding a variety of social organizations. Two weeks later, participants received a phone call from one of the organizations (a local homeless shelter) soliciting donations. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three DITF conditions of varying request sizes or a target request-only condition. Results indicated significant differences in verbal and actual compliance based on request size. Moreover, the results indicated the importance of perceived behavioral control in DITF contexts. Limitations and directions for future DITF study are discussed.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We consider the incentives for strategic voting in sequential elections, and test the propositions of this model on an original dataset covering all EU parliamentary elections and related national elections.

Publication Type: Individual Poster
Abstract: Background & Aims: Children begin showing gender-stereotyped toy preferences in their second year, but it is unclear if they have explicit knowledge of these stereotypes. Gender stereotype knowledge (GSK) for activities & occupations is evident by 2.5 years & reaches ceiling levels between 5 & 7 years. Recently, GSK has been studied in younger children using paradigms such as preferential looking & inductive generalization. These studies have produced inconsistent results: some find GSK in only one sex; others find only feminine or masculine GSK. This inconsistency may be due to: 1) measures not engaging the attention of very young children, 2) requiring boys to use dolls to indicate responses, which some boys resist, or 3) past items tested being unfamiliar to young children (e.g., a drill). The sequential touching paradigm (ST) may resolve the first two issues; it is an active paradigm that does not require play with dolls. Item familiarity was addressed via pre-testing with 3.5-year-olds (close in age to our group, but old enough to test with more traditional measures).
Methods: Eleven children (5 females, 6 males; M age = 24 months, 21 days) participated in a sequential touching task. Each child was presented with 4 feminine & 4 masculine toys (e.g., teapot, helicopter), & given two minutes to play while videotaped. Coders recorded the order and specific items the child intentionally touched. The final sample will consist of 24 children (half girls) in 3 age groups: 18, 24, & 30 months. Testing will be completed by April 2006.
Key Results: Mean run length (MRL) was calculated, & Monte Carlo simulations were used to identify "categorizers" (see Mandler et al., 1987 for details on ST analyses). The MRL (M = 1.98; SD = 0.55), was compared to the run length expected by chance (1.75). Touching behavior did not differ from chance, t(10) = 1.41, p<.10. As a group, children showed no evidence of categorization by gender stereotypes. However, Monte Carlo simulations (cutoff value of p<.10; as used in prior research) revealed that 63.6% of the children were categorizers. Further analyses will be performed when testing is complete. With the larger sample, we will look for age effects, sex differences & differences between feminine & masculine GSK.
Conclusions: Over half the children categorized toys in a manner consistent with gender stereotypes. Thus, the ST paradigm appears to be a valid method of assessing emerging GSK in very young children.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In late 1950 and early 1951 Great Britain almost engaged in a war against Iran (Persia). After Iran had nationalized the highly profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which ensured the UK obtained oil without having to pay in dollars it did not own) Great Britain mobilized its troops and had an invasion force ready in nearby Kuwait. The Labour Attlee Government hovered over the decision to move ahead with the invasion facing serious domestic problems and having serious difficulty in obtaining American diplomatic and logistical support. British decision making is characterised by frequently alternating between escalation and de-escalation the conflict. The paper will apply psychological control theory to analyzing decision making by the Attlee government.