Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The combined impact of the NPR-through its foundational New Strategic Framework and structural New Strategic Triad-on the military organizations tasked to implement this guidance represents a fundamental imperative to change that deserves emphasis. All organizations adapt to changes in their particular operating or task environment. Often the environmental changes are evolutionary, and the resulting organizational change process can be limited to adaptation and accommodation. However, fundamental-even revolutionary-changes in the operational environment can demand appropriately fundamental changes in the organizations that carry out those operations in that environment. That is the situation that today presents itself to the United States military services that are tasked to prepare and present forces and systems-strategic capabilities-to enact the dictates of the NPR and enable its New Strategic Triad.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines the transformation of civil-military relationships in two post-Communist states and so called "managed liberalization" as a move away from the militarized Communist state ethos and assesses to what degree this represents genuine liberalization and hence demilitarization of civil-military relationships.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Several studies have argued that U.S. Courts of Appeals compliance with higher court
preferences is partly caused by the presence of whistleblowers – potential dissenters –
on three-judge panels. Other studies have argued that dissents can be explained with the
whistleblower argument: Dissenters raise strategically alarms if a panel majority makes
a decision that is contrary to higher court preferences, and if the dissenter prefers the
higher court’s expected decision to the panel majority’s. The problem with the whistleblower
explanation of dissents is that the whistleblower explanation of compliance cannot explain
dissents – if panel majorities comply with higher court preferences, strategic dissents are
pointless. This paper presents a model that solves this problem. Taking the quality of legal
arguments into account, I argue that judges who disagree with the majority on a three-judge
appeals panel will dissent if their legal argument if stronger than that of the majority. In several
circumstances, it can be shown that the dissent in fact benefits the majority as it moves the
decision outcome closer to its policy ideal. The results highlight the need to systematically
analyze the legal arguments espoused in court opinions.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Proponents of the diversionary theory of war have often argued that domestic reselection incentives induce office-seeking leaders to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Previous formal models of diversionary theory, however, have ignored the critical role that strategic interaction plays in foreign policy decision-making. This article addresses this problem by developing a two-state, two-sided incomplete information deterrence model with domestic reselection. According to the model, reselection mechanisms increase a leader?s propensity to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Diversionary incentives in attacking states lead to an increase in war outcomes, while diversionary incentives in defending states may or may not increase the probability of war. The model also predicts that there will be nonmonotonic relationships between economic performance and war and between regime type and diversionary behavior, which may explain the discrepancies among many empirical tests of diversionary theory.