Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Relatively little is known about why developmental ?synergies? thrive in some regions and sectors and not in others. How are some subnational actors in the developing world able to transcend self-interest and overcome problems of collective action where incentives for cooperation are relatively weak? Focusing on the critical case of Brazil, I argue that variations in the design and efficacy of subnational industrial policies can be linked to the evolution of distinct subnational regimes which reflect historically uneven patterns of development, social mobilization, political party development, and class conflict within Brazil. Analyzing cases across these subnational regimes, I contrast contemporary industrial strategies pursued at the state level in the Southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul and the Northeastern state of Bahia. The analysis suggests that the formidable barriers to achieving synergistic strategies of industrial competitivity are particularly pronounced in the Northern macro-regions of Brazil where programmatic parties have relatively little influence and social mobilization is relatively low.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Most of the literature on federalism has emphasized the relationship between national and subnational governments, but has overlooked the organization of power at the subnational level. Likewise, most of the debate on the separation of powers in presidential, parliamentary, and mixed systems has neglected the role of federalism in bolstering the separation of powers. In this paper, we argue federalism may be defined as a constitutional arrangement that creates executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government at the subnational level. This definition has important implications for the literatures on federalism and the separation of powers, two themes often treated in isolation. First, it directs the attention of students of federalism to the neglected subject of the separation of powers at the subnational level. Second, it directs the attention of students of the separation of powers to the issue of federalism. We show that the existence of institutional mechanisms that override the subnational separation of powers in federal systems is problematic for democracy and deserves further attention. We also point to the fact that by safeguarding the subnational separation of powers, federalism can strengthen democracy.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the structure of interests in national and regional economic development strategies, the emergence of demands for greater regional autonomy, and how Central and East European states are likely to respond. Based on a case study of Hungary and involving survey research at the national and regional levels, this paper addresses the impact of national and sectoral level economic interests on the development of national government policies to promote economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe.Previous authors have argued that demands for greater subnational regional autonomy are driven by such factors as democratization and potentially ethnic identity, the carrot of EU benefits (structural and cohesion funds), the power and influence of the European Commission (in particular as a tool to weaken states), and even broader phenomena such as globalization. Ohmae (1993, 1995) argued that economically successful regions are emboldened by failed governance at the national level and the potential rewards of political autonomy at the regional level. More recently, Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) have argued that integration into supranational contexts reduces dependence on the state and emboldens demands for greater regional autonomy.I argue instead that demands for regional autonomy are the result of struggles over state resources that are strongly determined by the impact of economic geography. Economic integration in the European context drives greater differentiation on the basis of economic geography and regional development. Less advanced regions are likely to seek greater autonomy and incorporation into supranational political structures to the extent that national level struggles over resources potentially diminish their access to state resources. More advanced regions on the other hand are likely to seek greater autonomy, in particular in a context where redistributional forms of spending diminish their potential to draw on state resources. States at lower levels of economic development are subject to cohesion and convergence demands at both the national and regional levels, and are thus likely to be particularly torn between these competing sets of regional interests. In the context of these competing interests, this paper will explain why states make the choices they do regarding national and regional economic development strategies and the development of greater regional autonomy.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: As a result of globalization, as well as different internal processes such as democratization, decentralization and economic liberalization, there has been a growing participation of Mexican federal entities in international activities. However, unlike the rest of the entities, the Federal District remained foreign to these bonds with the exterior. Past administrations under Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Alejandro Encinas kept an austerity policy which left the capital distant from the rest of the world. It was until Marcelo Ebrard’s administration in 2006, that international activities became a priority. This change in policies was not only due to different internal and external processes, but also to Ebrard´s academic formation and his desire to position himself politically, both nationally and internationally, leading the Federal District from isolationism to a high level of international participation.