Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Recent analyses of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court confirm that this method of interest group participation influences litigation success. However, none of these studies examine the affect of amicus briefs on the decision making of the individual justices. A byproduct of this is that scholars have yet to develop explanations for the influence of amicus briefs consistent with existing theories of the choices justices make. This paper attempts to remedy this state of affairs by developing a theoretical framework in which the influence of amicus participation is viewed in light of two theories of judicial choice: the legal and attitudinal models. I consider amicus briefs as sources of legal and political information for the justices and examine whether their influence is mediated by judicial ideology (e.g., dependent upon the congruence of the information in the briefs with the policy preferences of the justices). I subject my hypotheses to empirical validation by examining the votes of all justices during the 1953-1997 terms in free expression law, which allows me to control for additional influences on judicial decision making, such as case factors and precedent. The results indicate that, while amicus briefs play a significant role in judicial decision making, attitudes do not act as a mediating variable as to how the justices respond to the information contained in the briefs. Rather, these results are consistent with the legal model.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since the late 1980s there has been a change and variance in the incidence of the number of cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides each term. The resulting variance has been a decline in the number of cases the Court has decided in recent years in comparison to the 1960s, 70s and 80s. This transformation has received a large amount of attention from both scholars and the media. Yet, despite the increased awareness, scholars have not been able to convincingly answer why the docket has shrunk to such an extent or to explain any reason for the variance in docket size (Chemerinsky 2007, Obrien 2005, Scott 2006). Positing similar hypotheses addressed, but untested in previous literature, i.e. ideology of the Court, Age of the Court, Party composition of the Court, Incidence of Presidential Vetoes, and administrative approaches of the Chief Justices, we examine the variance in docket size and test the hypotheses to identify any trends in the docket size. Using an OLS regression our preliminary results suggest that the incidence of presidential vetoes, the ideology of the Court and the acting Chief Justice are explanatives for the variance in docket size. Our preliminary results may suggest additional evidence similar to Segal, Spaeth, Cover and Norpoth's analysis of the importance of ideology on the Court, not only in identifying voting variance among the justices, but also in explaining the variance of the docket size.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Candidates for federal office often claim that elections are important because they influence the Supreme Court. But do voters hold candidates accountable for the behavior of the justices? Are votes for Congress and the President associated with attitudes about the Supreme Court? The analysis is based on original data collected by the author as part of the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The sample includes a national sample of 1,000 respondents to an internet survey administered by Polimetrix. My questions probe voter attitudes about the Supreme Court, including diffuse support for the institution and whether voters think legal qualifications or political attitudes should influence the nomination process. These measures are then associated with the vote for Congress and the President, after controlling for other potential influences on the vote. I hypothesize that there is no direct correlation between attitudes about the Supreme Court and votes for the President and Congress, even when voters disapprove of the job that the Supreme Court is doing and think politics should influence the selection of justices. The findings have important implications for the democratic accountability of the Supreme Court.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The US Supreme Court has had a highly influential part in political, economic and social aspects of American life. Yet, that courts are passive political players is an almost undisputed premise in the judicial politics literature. Having neither will nor force, the judiciary department is the least dangerous branch. I argue that its gate keeping capacity allows the Court to act strategically so as to proactively direct the law of the land in the Court’s favorite directions. This is possible if justices act strategically during Cert. In addition to selecting cases with the final disposition in mind (a strategic behavior during Cert well established in the literature), I argue that justices consider the opinion when populating their docket. I bring two types of evidence. First are data from justices’ private papers. Second are Generalized Linear Error Correction Models with data from the BURGERAGENDA Spaeth database. These latter models test the hypothesis that justices consider opinion writing at the time of Cert. Theoretical implications and future research are discussed.