Publication Type: Paper (prepared oral presentation)
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: According to system justification theory, people seek to maintain the legitimacy and stability of existing forms of social arrangements. We are interested in whether different types of social systems, each characterized by a unique historical backdrop and development, are justified to a different extent or in different ways. The present study investigated views held by American (n = 108) and Hungarian (n = 114) participants concerning what is fair in the workplace and what is not. Participants rated the fairness of, their satisfaction with, and the typicality of 4 hypothetical work situations, which differed in terms of distributive justice principles. Participants’ motivation to justify the system was also recorded.
Our findings indicate a general tendency to view the equity-based work situations more positively. Further, in both American and Hungarian contexts, the motivation to justify the system was associated with participants perceiving a range of workplace situations as fairer and feeling more satisfied with them. Based on the characteristics of one’s specific social system, however, these tendencies played out somewhat differently. Specifically, for Hungarians system justification was only associated with more positive views of work situations based on equality principles, whereas for Americans it was associated with more positive views of work situations based on equity principles. This research not only promotes a better understanding of the situational antecedents of people’s responses to justice-related events, but it also provides further evidence for the significance of system justification motivation for responses to equity and equality in people’s daily lives.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: For a long time, electoral reforms in established democracies were rare, except in France. Since the early 1990s, however, they have been more frequent. Most of the time, these reforms were radical, making it difficult to analyze the effects of some main components of the electoral system, such as electoral formula, ballot structure, district magnitude, size of legislature and number of candidates/ parties.

From this angle, the 2004 French European electoral reform constitutes an exception since it changed only one main component by removing the single nationwide constituency and dividing the country into eight multi-seats constituencies, whereas the other main electoral elements still were identical. It is a perfect ‘before-and-after’ case-study, monitoring the impact of an electoral reform over successive elections within a particular country.

This paper points out mechanical effects of a decrease in the average district magnitude on the representation. At the national level, this change led to an increase in the nationwide deviation from proportionality, to a decrease in the effective number of parliamentary parties and to a rise of the break-even point. At the local level, that of the constituency, variations in district magnitude impacted the seats votes equation and the exclusion threshold. In 2004, larger parties have been advantaged by the electoral reform. So, the district magnitude is really the decisive factor. French electoral reform has undoubtedly exerted some mechanical effects but also psychological ones: at the local level, the effective number of electoral parties decreased as the district magnitude decreased. In other words, variations in district magnitude influenced the voters and modified their vote. This reminds us that there is a strategic vote in PR, like in first-past-the-post, even if the former situation is still less studied.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The main argument of this paper is that the level of institutionalization is a critical dimension for understanding party systems. Until the mid-1990s, the literature on parties and party systems neglected this fact, as most work on these subjects implicitly assumed a high level of institutionalization of the party system. Yet without focusing on institutionalization, it is impossible to account for important characteristics of party systems in most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies. Voters, parties, and party systems in most post-1978 competitive regimes are qualitatively different from those of the advanced industrial democracies.
We focus on the first two dimensions of party system institutionalization that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999: 22-39) developed: the stability of interparty competition and the depth of party roots (or anchoring) in society. In these two dimensions, there are persistent and large differences in institutionalization between most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies and the advanced industrial democracies. Most of the advanced industrial democracies exhibit far greater stability in interparty competition than most post-1978 democracies.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Realignment theory has long offered the primary framework for understanding American political history, particularly as it relates to the party system. The 1896 election has played a particularly prominent role in the realignment literature since the theory’s inception, and the period of American politics stretching from William McKinley’s first victory to Franklin Roosevelt’s ascension to the White House is often referred to as the “System of 1896.” However, Mayhew’s (2002) recent critique of realignment theory has called its key assumptions into serious question. At the same time, leading scholars have noted the failure of the American politics literature to adequately explore the manner in which international forces have shaped domestic politics (Mayhew 2005; Katznelson 2002).

This paper builds on Mayhew’s realignment critique and heeds suggestions to explore international events as causal variables in explaining domestic politics by examining the role the Spanish-American War and World War I played in the 1898, 1900, 1918, and 1920 elections. I argue here that realignment theory has led to two faulty assumptions concerning these contests that obscure the wars’ electoral influences. In the first two cases, it has led to the conclusion that continued Republican dominance was somehow inevitable. But in fact, it was Republican success in prosecuting the war that clearly accounted for their ensuing electoral triumphs. As both the rhetoric and the focus of the 1898 midterm and 1900 presidential elections demonstrate, the war propelled a new set of issues onto the campaign agenda and altered the course of these contests. Imperialism was elevated from a non-issue to a pivotal matter of constant dispute in the political and electoral realms. At the same time, the major issue cleavages that realignment theory claims emanated from the supposedly pivotal 1896 election (such as monetary policy or “free silver”), and allegedly invested American politics for a generation, largely disappeared from the political agenda in the face of more compelling international concerns. In the later two cases—1918 and 1920—political scientists have generally viewed the Woodrow Wilson years as an anomaly within the “System of 1896,” leading them to minimize the importance of the 1920 Republican victory. They argue the Republican party, dating back to McKinley’s “realigning” 1896 victory, was still dominant and constituted the day’s reigning political order. This connection is important because it suggests the return to Republican rule in 1918 and 1920 was natural and predictable given the dominant 1896-based political system. I argue that contrary to this standard view, the 1920 results were far from inevitable and were heavily influenced by World War I.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Drawing upon constructivist insights into the dynamics of socialization and the emerging literature on systemic democratic peace, this paper compares Immanuel Kant?s ?Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Scetch? (1795) and G.W.F. Hegel?s critique in the ?Elements of the Philosophy of Right? (1820) in terms of the logic underpinning their view of the international system. I argue that both accounts can be read as incorporating a reflexive logic in which state units internalize patterns of behavior through a process of socialization. Differences between the two are, however, evident in Hegel?s description of sociological dynamics that define a ?negative? feedback loop pushing the system towards a bifurcated equilibrium of negative identification and discouraging cultural change. In essence, Hegel argues that the Kantian peace plan could not usher ?perpetual peace?, for if a liberal community of democratic states were to emerge, the very process of liberal identity formation would always carry with it enmity in relation with non-liberal states. Kant on the other hand, provides an endogenous account of how sociological dynamics and ?positive? feedback loops push the system towards a dynamic core-peripherie continuum converging around the rule of law. I argue that Kant?s transformative logic is more apt to describe patterns of democratization in the international system than Hegel?s reproductive logic. However, Kant?s approach remains ambivalent as to whether systemic change entails a transformation of the properties of the system, a transformation of the properties of the units, or a change in the fundamental behavior of the units populating the system. As such, the precise mechanisms and transition points through which the dynamics of socialization alter domestic practices are undertheorized in the Kantian approach. In order to fill in this gap, I draw on the spiral model developed by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, bracketing the socialization process into three phases differing in their underlying mode of social action.