Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The aim of this paper will be to evaluate the impact of leaders' operational code beliefs on the negotiation of separatist crises within the Russian Federation between 1990 and 1994. The paper will attempt to explain the divergent outcomes of negotiations between Moscow and the separatist republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan. Whereas the Tatarstan separatist crisis was resolved peacefully through the negotiation of a bilateral agreement signed in February 1994, the Chechen separatist crisis escalated into a protracted military conflict. To account for these divergent outcomes, the approach taken in this paper will be to analyze these parallel negotiation processes as a series of strategic interactions between the principal decision-makers, namely Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President Mintimer Shaimiev (Tatarstan), and President Djokhar Dudaev (Chechnya). Using an automated version of the Verbs-in-Context (VICS)program to analyze the content of public statements by these leaders over time, this study will test the thesis that leaders' beliefs interacted with changes in domestic political conditions to produce either a conflictual or cooperative strategic orientation.