Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Terrorism varies in its deadliness. The 9/11 attack, for example, killed approximately 2500 people, but other attacks have been bloodless. Why? I hypothesize that the rate at which terrorist organizations kill is inversely related to the amount of competition they face from others. Groups that utilize terror vie with one another for support from the members of society they purport to represent and for new recruits. The more groups contend for support, the more they avoid attacks that might appall backers and push them into rival camps. I test this argument using a sample from the ITERATE data set of international terrorist attacks committed against the state of Israel between 1968 and 2002.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We present a hierarchical model of terror organizations that uses the observed variance in terrorists motivations to explain patterns of underfunding and to identify conditions under which government anti-terror efforts can be counter-productive.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: For a number of years, scholars and practitioners have been focusing on the dangerous spread of weapons of mass destruction -- especially as it relates to the current threat of international terrorism. Such a focus is a worthy endeavor, but it ignores the impact that the spread of small arms and light weapons has on terrorist activity. Those who study arms transfers have suggested that weapons sales (legal and illegal) fuel terrorist violence, but an empirical connection has never been made. This study concentrates on this connection between small arms proliferation and terrorism. Ultimately, the study shows how, why and where small arms controls are necessary for an effective fight against terrorist activity.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper presents a formal model of terrorist violence under varying conditions of inter-terrorist competition. Specifically, I examine the levels of terrorist violence expected under conditions of perfect and imperfect monopoly on terrorism (a terrorist group does not compete with other terrorist groups) as well as perfect and imperfect competition between terrorist groups. The model yields predictions regarding equilibria of terrorist violence and has implications for counter-terrorist policy.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The foreign policy analysis literature typically treats terrorist leaders as military threats or religiously-inspired actors. In this paper, we attempt to decode the political logic of leaders of three prominent terrorist organizations (the Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah and global Al-Qaeda), using the ADA approach and a model based on Poliheuristic theory. Our findings indicate that similar to other political leaders, terrorist leaders attempt to avoid major political loss. This risk-aversion is effective either on the intra-group dimension (the leader's political standing vis-a-vis competing power-centers inside the organization), or on the inter-group dimension (the organization's position vis-a-vis other organizations, parties, and governments). Each of these dimensions is non-compensatory relative to other dimensions relevant to terrorist decisions (such as military, religious, etc), and their respective weight in the process is influenced by the organization's structure and its internal political dynamics.