Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The concept of structural power, the power accrued through the definition of frameworks or rules, has been effectively used by IPE scholars to describe the political relations of the international financial order. This concept has been particularly useful in explaining the privileged position of the United States and allows one to see beyond the apparent paradox of the world?s sole remaining superpower?s position as largest global debtor, a position which arises from current global macroeconomic imbalances. This unique structural power which falls to the US state has historically developed out of the complex interrelationship between the US state and financial markets, both domestic and international. This paper focuses on the relationship between US structural power and the changing role of the US Treasury department in international financial affairs that developed out of the financial imbalances of the 1960s associated with the dollar overhang. Specifically, I look at the ways in which the Treasury has been involved in the generation of structural power by defining and defending the dollar?s numeraire role and working to manage/expand the market for US government securities.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Scholars of European politics frequently make reference
to the instability that tends to characterize the Italian political
system in the post-war period. Observers point out that coalitional
infighting, a fractured parliament, and inter-party conflict make
policy formulation difficult in Italy. Observers also tend to focus a
great deal of attention onto Italy's traditionally unstable political
party system, to the exclusion of other formal institutions and
processes.
This paper argues that despite the apparent instability observed in the
Italian political system, Italian policy-making, and budgetary policy
in particular, has undergone
some important changes that has led to stronger and more stable
executive guidance of the budgetary process. These changes took place
primarily during the 1980s and 1990s, and are both institutional and
political in nature. More specifically, the late 1980s and 1990s
witnessed the growing autonomy of the Italian treasury in budgetary
decision-making. The greater autonomy of the treasury was underpinned
by specific political choices in the 1990s, the implementation of new
budget legislation in 1988 and 1997, decisions and decrees by the
political executive at key moments, and new informal rules of the
budgetary game. These domestic developments were reinforced by
exogenous constraints in the post-1992 period, most notably the EU
convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht treaty.
This paper argues that the new rules of the budgetary game have
permitted more effective internal executive guidance of public policy
in general, and budgetary policy in particular. This paper first traces
the key changes that strengthened executive coordination of budgeting
in the 1980s and 1990s. It then turns to the current Berlusconi
government. The paper examines the implications of the new rules of the
budgetary game on the Berlusconi government's freedom of action in the
sphere of public policy. Finally, the paper also calls attention to the
need for observers of Italy to move away from its almost exclusive
treatment of the Italian political party system, and towards a greater
concern with how Italy's formal institutions and processes shape
policy decision-making. This will complement the growing literature on
other countries concerning changes in executive policy coordination
over recent years.