Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Turner et al. (2003) conducted an experiment to empirically test whether gossip functions as a positive social communicative act, or whether gossip is perceived negatively, arguing that whether gossip serves as social glue or relational ruin is a function of the interaction between gossip valence and the relationship between the source and the target. Two experiments are presented here to re-test and extend Turner et al.�s findings.
In Experiment 1, as hypothesized, individuals trusted their friends more than they trusted strangers regardless of the valence of gossip. Positive gossip led to spikes in trust and negative gossip produced sharp drops in ability to trust strangers. Data also indicate that when strangers gossip negatively they will be disliked and distrusted. Persuasiveness of the message did not change as a function of the independent variables. These results are consistent with Turner et al.�s hypotheses. In experiment 2, expectancy violations were measured to empirically test whether a positive or negative impression of the gossiper depended upon the valence of the gossip and the relationship between the source and the target. Also, salience (relevance or irrelevance) of gossip was considered to test whether the salience of the gossip affects trust and liking. Data supported the finding of Study 1. Results indicated that there were no main effect of salience on impressions of trust and liking, but salience did interact with gossip valence to affect trust, suspicion, and negative expectancy violations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Survey after survey finds Latin Americans trust political parties less than any other political, economic, and social institution or actor. Do the low marks citizens give political parties come chiefly from concerns over integrity, competence, or responsiveness? Stated in pedagogical terms, what “rubrics” do citizens employ to evaluate the trustworthiness of political parties? To appreciate the consequences of low party trust in Latin America we must know more about the criteria upon which citizens in the region judge party trustworthiness. This study maps the subjective rubrics of party trustworthiness of over 180 subjects in Chile and Argentina using a Q-methodological approach. Considering the distinct paths of party system development in the two cases, one would expect little empirical overlap in the way these subjects judge parties. Nonetheless, in each case three distinct rubrics of party trustworthiness are found, and these rubrics exhibit a high degree of cross-case congruence. The MPSA conference is a crucial step towards the dissemination and publication of this research, defended as part of my dissertation in 2008. The paper would fit well on panels on political culture in Latin America or political trust more broadly.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A trust-signaling game is constructed in which players may or may not send a signal of trustworthiness. The evolutionary consequences of signaling costs and equilibrium selection are studied using a concept of evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Unless the difference between the signaling costs for the trustworthy and untrustworthy types is sufficiently large, signals are underutilized, the trustworthy types get marginalized, and distrust pervades in a society. When the signaling costs allow separation of the trustworthy from the untrustworthy, a stable evolutionary equilibrium does not exist. What characterizes the evolutionary dynamics under the separating costs condition are cycling between pooling and separating equilibria and fluctuation of the proportion of trustworthy types. With a reasonable set of behavioral assumptions, however, it is shown that the trustworthy types can coordinate and cause equilibrium switching, shortening the length of the cycle and maintain the trustworthy as the majority in a society.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Does vetting promote or undermine the building of trustworthy public institutions? This paper examines vetting in general, and the case of lustration in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, to understand how and under what conditions vetting promotes trust in public institutions. The removal from office and other public positions of individuals guilty of committing abuses in the previous regime has the potential to undermine trust in government and democratic consolidation. This paper examines the manner in which lustration breaks cycles of distrust and helps to foster the creation of public institutions worthy of citizen trust. This paper explores how lustration affects perceptions of the interests, incentives, and capabilities of public institutions, thereby changing public perceptions of their trustworthiness.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Trust problems are abundant in economic and social life. Often,
trust problems can be solved by credible sanctions, reputation, or
in repeated games. In one-shot games without a possibility for
sanctions or reputation building, signaling, in the sense of a
costly pre-play investment, may help to overcome such trust
problems.
We assume a trust situation with two types of trustees. Trustees
have the same preferences but act under different structural
conditions. The long-term types play a repeated game while the
short-term types are in a one-shot situation. Hence, trustees are
distinguishable by their discount factors. However, trustees hold
private information about their type, i.e., trustors do not know the
type of a trustee. Under these conditions it would be beneficial to
both the trustor and the long-term trustee, if the trustee was able
to credibly communicate his type.
We construct a model of the trust game and describe the conditions
for a separating signaling equilibrium. Hypotheses derived from the
model are investigated in experiments in Russia and Switzerland.
We find that trustees behave in accordance with the qualitative
predictions of the model. However, they do not invest as much as is
required by the strict rationality assumptions of the model.
Nevertheless, there is a correlation between the amount invested by
the trustee and a trustor's probability to place trust. Contrary to
predictions, investments did not enhance the level of trust compared
to the control group without investment possibility.