Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Exchange rate policy cannot be modeled as a simple product of domestic politics, as Jeff Frieden does in his recent work on this topic. Countries deciding whether or not to go on or off the gold standard may have been able to make these decisions separately based on domestic politics, without coordination or bargaining, and small countries may still be able to do so with regard to the dollar or euro in today's monetary regime. But big countries, including the United States, cannot make exchange rate policy on their own. It takes two to float, by which I mean that it is more accurate to model exchange rate policy as a two-level game in which two partners each seek an exchange rate regime and level that reflects domestic political interests and institutions, with the outcome determined by bargaining. The United States cannot make a decision to float vis-a-vis the renminbi without China going along. Japan has learned that it cannot devalue the yen without the United States blessing this policy. The paper lays out the two-level logic of exchange rate bargaining and illustrates it by examining several cases of United States - Asia exchange rate bargaining, including US-Japan since 1980 and US-China since 2000.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: An audit of empirical research over the past ten years shows evidence of publication bias in two major journals (APSR and AJPS) and twoprominent literatures in political behavior (economic voting and the effect of negative advertisements).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture consisted of an operational and an ideational level. It is analyzed why the European Community successfully influenced the former level and why US interests prevailed at the latter.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In September 2001, shortly after the start of the new millennium and a successful seven year crime decline, the New York City Police Department faced its most difficult challenge when international terrorists mounted their largest attack on American soil. In less than two hours, over 2,700 innocent lives were lost. However, given the limited time frame, New York City rescue personnel were able to successfully evacuate over 26,000 occupants from the World Trade Center complex, over 200,000 people from the surrounding area, and more than one million from the island of Manhattan. Large scale disaster planning and personal leadership proved to be the leading contributors to the positive aspects of this tragic incident. A retired NYPD commander who coordinated rescue operations at the unfolding scene will examine both the successful and problematic factors of this traumatic event and outline the necessary counter-terrorism measures that have since been instituted.

Publication Type: Proceeding