Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper will examine the importance and impact of image - in which propaganda is a vital tool - as a component of a state's power. The contention is that the U.S. entered the Vietnam War as a hugely powerful state with a particular global image, but after a destructive regional war this image disintegrated, with global consequences. The change in the U.S. image, post-Vietnam, has added considerably to its international problems -and may well be a partial contributing cause.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: What accounts for the different outcomes in British decisions in Vietnam (not commit forces), and Iraq (commit forces), despite the similarities in the situations? In both Vietnam and Iraq a U.S. President pressed a Labour Party Prime Minister to commit forces to a war that was unpopular in the U.K. Yet, while Harold Wilson resisted repeated attempts by Lyndon Johnson to secure a commitment of troops, Tony Blair went out of his way to support George W. Bush, despite the domestic political cost. In seeking to account for these differing outcomes, I consider four explanatory variables: structural realism, alliance dynamics, domestic politics, individual characteristics of the Prime Minister.Method: Structured, focused case comparison methodology is used to compare the two episodes in a systematic fashion. These cases are in many ways an ideal pairing given the similarities between the situations yet the divergent outcomes. In order to measure the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister, I employ automated content analysis techniques that process an individual?s verbal output to reveal personality traits.Results: Structural realism fails to account for the difference in outcome between the two cases, as both responses (commit troops, don?t commit troops) can be deduced from a structural perspective. Alliance dynamics explanations are also unsatisfactory. Harold Wilson?s behaviour is contrary to what we would expect from a junior partner, and, while Blair?s choice is more consistent with this approach, the evidence shows that Blair reached the decision on grounds other than a pure calculation of alliance maintenance necessity. Domestic politics, on the other hand, is part of the explanation for the difference in outcome. Wilson was in a much more precarious position than Blair, and hence had to give more attention to the left-wing, anti-war part of the Labour Party than did Blair. However, this is not the whole story, and I find that a convincing account of the different outcomes in these cases requires a consideration of the differences between the Prime Ministers. Blair was a much more ?black and white? thinker than Harold Wilson, making Blair more amenable to the ?good and evil? framing of the situation by the U.S. than the less Manichean Wilson. In addition, Blair had fashioned a closed advisory system which insulated him from the opposition of most of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the war, whereas the Wilson administration operated through more open procedures. Consequently, my conclusion is that a combination of domestic politics and leadership style best accounts for the difference in outcomes in British decision making on Vietnam and Iraq. The paper will be of interest to those working in foreign policy analysis and decision making, the U.S. - U.K. relationship, and alliance dynamics generally.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper discusses the Vietnamese government’s and the Vietnam Workers Party’s difficulties in dealing with two “big brothers” — the Soviet Union and China — during 1965-1972, as the conflict between them deepened and the Vietnam War escalated and expan

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines between-group differences in support for military action in the period since the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam War, support for military action was stronger among men, whites, the more educated, the more affluent, and younger persons. In the post-Vietnam era, men have remained consistently more supportive of military action, despite recent changes in gender roles and gender politics. Racial differences have remained strong, but not uniformly so. The gap between whites and nonwhites has been most pronounced in periods of intense partisanship or when military events have sparked a �rally-�round-the-flag� response that affected whites more than nonwhites. Education and income differences have followed a similar pattern, although there are signs of a weakening of socioeconomic differences in attitudes to war, especially on the education variable. The sharpest change in the post-Vietnam era has been the relative decline in support for military action among younger persons. These data are used to explore the underlying causes and meanings of pro- and antiwar attitudes and to speculate on the prospects and likely contours of public opposition to the war on Iraq.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Vietnam still remains associated with 'The Vietnam War', the worst of all wars since 1945 in terms of the number of battle deaths. But in the late 1980s, Vietnam went through a political transition, similar to the one China had gone through ten years earl