Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Interstate wars are not one of the most salient features of current World Politics. Indeed, the prevailing patterns of post- Cold War Conflict reveal an increasing trend in intrastate wars that spill over borders. This paper aims to provide insights from an inter-state war in the post-Cold War era and hence contribute to the ongoing debate on the changing nature of warfare. The case-study provides evidence to contradict the strand of the literature which claims that we are witnessing a decisive transformation of warfare (Van Creveld 1991); (Kaldor 1999). Beyond the continuities with the 30 years civil war, namely in the relations between the Tigray People?s Liberation Front(TPLF) and the Eritrean People?s Liberation Front (EPLF), the 1998-2000 war was waged between the armed forces of two sovereign states. The paper highlights the value- added of the case- study to the debates on the transformation of warfare, on the patterns of warfare in Africa and on the dynamics of state formation in the South. This is one of the few cases of inter-state war in Africa. is a crucial contribution to comparative perspectives on the causation of intra-state (civil) wars and interstate wars in Africa and in other regions in the South. The central claim of this paper is that neighbours do fight over territory. Indeed, the paper will argue that territory is central to understand the causes, the conduct and the outcomes of the 1998- 2000 interstate war. The inability of either state to accept any territorial changes reveals that territory is central for the definition of the sovereign state.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: During times of war, soldiers are deployed as weapons not only on the military battlefield, but also in the domestic public policy arena and within the pitched battle for public opinion. To mobilize support for war and to control dissent, US political elites rely on the hegemony of deeply engrained values, beliefs and narratives regarding soldiering and the citizen’s duty to support the troops. Drawing on secondary materials, we show that the Vietnam War-era peace movement was accused of being both unpatriotic and anti-soldier, and that this narrative has become a powerful force in popular history and contemporary discourses. The Gulf War peace movement and the Iraq War peace movement have each had to engage what we term the “discursive legacy” of this earlier debate. To understand how the U.S. peace movement has responded, we qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the official statements from five US peace movement organizations (PMOs) during the Gulf War and 15 during the Iraq War.
We argue that during the Gulf War, peace movement framing created a “web of support” as to who should be cared about and supported by conscientious citizens. This web was extended to include more than soldiers, thereby de-coupling the support frame from the American nation and the US state. During the Iraq War, PMOs engaged in proactive, anticipatory framing as they attempted to turn the tables on the administration by aggressively redefining what it means to support the troops. By “harnessing hegemony” and the good soldier construct, they turned it back on the administration as they developed an elaborated “discourse of betrayal.”

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The variety and frequency of analogical reasoning in the public discourse surrounding the invasion of Iraq is remarkable. Perhaps most remarkable is the comparison that has been made between the U.S. Civil War and the Iraq civil war. The purposes of this paper are to show why the American Civil War analogy was deployed by advocates of “staying the course” in Iraq, consider what effect this discursive strategy may have had on American policy in Iraq, and finally to compare the U.S. Civil War and Iraq civil war using an analytical framework derived from civil war theory. In moving toward achieving these goals, I employ cognitive and constructivist theories on the role of ideas in foreign policy, as well as theories of the causes of civil wars. The central findings have both academic and policy relevance. First, several Bush administration officials and certain public intellectuals have used the American Civil War analogy (and other rhetorical devices) to shape policy in the short-run and American collective identity in the long-run. Second, the U.S. Civil War analogy does not provide useful guidance for American policy in Iraq. Policy makers and analysts should not allow the memory of the American experience with internal conflict affect their understanding of current and future civil wars. Third, current theories of internal war can provide a useful lens for understanding both ‘old’ and ‘new’ civil wars, but are much better suited to explaining recent civil wars. This finding suggests that unlike international relations theory, internal war theories are time-bound. It is striking that modern theories of internal war cannot explain one of the most important civil wars of the past 200 years.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: There is a popular assumption that congressional voting against acts of war will lead to electoral retaliation. In The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare War (1995), Regens, Gaddie and Lockerbie attempted to shed light on this “cost of war” assumption. They also sought to test the durability of the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon and determine how the two hypotheses interacted.
They reviewed the elections following the Mexican American War, World War I and the Persian Gulf War to determine the effect of a “no” vote. The authors found that only the electoral results following the declaration of war in World War I was significantly related to congressional votes against the war. Neither the Mexican American War nor the Persian Gulf War yielded statistically significant results. There results were mixed. “The evidence presented here offers some support for the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon as well as the costs-of-war model and its impact on elections” (Regens et. al 1995, 180). Their study questions the strength of the war vote assumption, but calls for more investigation.
This paper will further the research done by Regens, Gaddie and Lockerbie in two ways. It will reexamine the Persian Gulf War to determine if the election following the war was unique. The authors determined “we do not find support for either the rally hypothesis or the cost-of-war hypothesis in the 1992 elections” (Regens et. al. 1995, 180). Strengthening statistical analysis on the Gulf War will help determine if the Persian Gulf War was different and why that was the case.
Additionally, the original analysis will be updated, by considering the electoral effects of the War on Terror. It is important to examine more recent war resolutions; to consider individual vote choice by voters and to asses the effect of a more politicized war environment. Were the Gulf War results unique or were they indicative of a new trend? What effect the War on Terror had in the 2002 mid-term elections and the recent presidential elections will add to the contemporary literature on the cost-of-war and rally hypotheses.
Roll call votes on the “war” declarations will be reviewed and compared to election results. Additional variables will be controlled for, these include: effects of redistricting, rate of retirement and overall incumbent win/loss ratio. Proximity of war vote to general election will also be considered.

Regens, James, Ronald Keith Gaddie, Brad Lockerbie. March 1995. “The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 39 No. 1:168-182