Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Due to the fact that in the past, early warning in the past was understood much as a tool for security threats to nations, and only later on to intra-state conflicts, the idea of a distinct set of (greater structural) indicators for tracking threats was the preferred method of data collection that later on informed analysis. More recent experiences, however, show the contextual nature of conflicts that is either confined to specific regions or countries, or possibly so the interest of the user at hand. This is also linked to a growing trend in early warning to focus on human security (or a responsibility to protect) over state security, hence making threats far more complex to capture. Thus, while the analysis at the end may not necessarily have changed much, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the way of developing indicators has become much more refined to the situation at hand. This then may mean to either narrow indicators to a specific context, or increase a set of indicators to include context specific issues. Using examples from the field, this paper will explore the advantage (but also disadvantages) of a more specific indicator selection that focuses more on a micro-level of conflict, rather than big pattern. The experiences from three examples will be taken: a) the early warning system developed for the conflict early warning mechanism (CEWARN) of the Inter-Governmental Authority of Development in the Horn of Africa, b) the early warning system of the Foundation for Co-Existence in Sri Lanka, and c) the development of an early warning system for the South of Afghanistan (currently being initiated). In addition, as a crosscutting example, the issue gendered early warning indicators will be revisited as an argument for fine-tuning our data-collection and analysis to include micro-level issues.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: At the Canadian Consortium on Human Security Conference at Carleton University from October 3-5, 2003, one conclusion was drawn. ?The lessons of state failure are that intervention is best accomplished early in the form of prevention, before a state has descended to the status of a failed one. There are plenty of early warning indicators; it is early action that is the problem. Thus, the international community needs to develop an independent mechanism to determine when is the right time to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state.? There are two logical leaps entailed in drawing this conclusion. The first is the determination that since there were already numerous early signs pointing towards an explosion of violence, death and destruction, the issue is not early warning but early action and the determination of the appropriate time for that early action. The second logical leap is the jump from the need for early action to the conclusion that it is the primary responsibility of the international community to determine when to intervene. As a result of research on case studies, I have drawn quite different conclusions. The issue is not the number of early warning indicators, but whether those signs are collected, analyzed and communicated in a systematic way to decision-makers with a capacity to intervene early and effectively. Secondly, the primary responsibility does not belong to the international community to determine the timing of an intervention. When timing is left to the international community, the intervention is very delayed and inadequate. What are the alternatives to the game plan that resulted from the 2003 Carleton Conference? The issue is not simply determining precisely when to intervene and doing so only under the auspices of the international community. The issue is also how to intervene and who is in a best position to do so. Since early warning is best carried out at the local level, local, state and regional organizations in Africa had to assume responsibility for developing their early warning systems. Second, local, state and regional organizations had to develop response strategies and capacities and not wait or become dependent upon very slow and inevitably very late (and usually very inadequate) reaction responses from the international community. The conference assumed that failures to intervene resulted from lack of political will and not from ?lack of machinery?. (p. 3, Final Report) In reality, the reverse is the case. Building the machinery of early warning and response capabilities are prerequisites for preventing and managing violent conflicts. Analytic tools are needed to both justify intervention and to develop the management tools to ?determine how best to carry out the job?.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Recent academic and policy studies point to an increased threat to humanitarian aid workers operating in the field (Abbott 2006, King 2002, Sheik 2000, Martin 1999, VanBrabant 1998). These authors arrive at very different conclusions about the types of threats humanitarian aid workers face, in part due to different methods each employs to identify threats and in part because they tend to rely on different sources of data. As UN and NGO field security reporting tools become more widely used and more sophisticated, many of the discrepancies about sources of threat to humanitarian workers are being resolved. However, few scholars examine the link between identifying threats to humanitarian aid workers and the use of risk management tools to prevent or mitigate threats to humanitarian aid workers. This link between early warning and early response used to protect agency staff and assets holds important lessons for other early warning systems designed to prevent and mitigate conflict on a wider scale.I evaluate the link between security reporting and security risk management through a case study analysis of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Security Incident Reporting System and the UNDSS Security Risk Management model. A comparison of UNDSS field reporting methods and their security risk management model is used to identify opportunities and constraints for reducing the risk to and mitigating the impact of threats to aid workers in the field. Inferences are drawn to identify applicable lessons for improving early warning response designed to prevent and mitigate political conflict.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper reviews selected concepts and empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive science about limitations in the way that individuals process information and make decisions, and applies these to early warning and response. Cognitive biases can exert influence on early warning by affecting the warning analyst’s judgments and/or the policymaker’s evaluation of warnings and decision about a response. Taken together, literature on cognitive biases suggests that warning analysis will tend to overestimate risks and policymakers will tend to resist calls for preventive action, preferring to risk a greater loss in the future rather than accept a certain one now. The paper then discusses possible strategies to minimize and manage the negative effects of cognitive biases on early warning. These strategies have yet to prove fully their ability to address fundamental cognitive biases in applied settings. The author concludes that additional research into the effectiveness of these strategies is important for designing and implementing more effective early warning systems.