Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In making the case for the scientific study of ideas in international politics, Alexander Wendt’s version of scientific realism preserved many vestiges of the positivist model of science. In order to retain scientific legitimacy within a discipline whose philosophical vision has not yet discarded the mistaken conflation of science and positivism, Wendt constructed a middle way between the alleged positivist/interpretivist dichotomy, rather than fully rejecting both altogether and turning to the fundamentally different alternative offered by philosophical realism. This chapter will explain how the failure to complete the break with the positivist model of science, as well as the adoption of certain interpretivist positions, has distorted and undermined his presentation of scientific realism, created confusion around the content and implications of realism, and compromised the valuable philosophical potential of his wider project. Given the great importance and widespread impact of Wendt’s contributions in IR to the understanding of scientific realism in particular and knowledge of philosophy of science in general, this chapter is devoted to examining, revising, and, where appropriate, correcting several components of Wendt’s presentation of scientific realism, especially regarding the realist positions on ontology, epistemology, the structure-agent relationship, and the emergent, enduring, and causal properties of material and ideational social structures. The chapter finishes by discussing how Wendt’s (idealist) metaphysics ended up privileging his (constructivist) substantive theory, highlighting what, for realists, are the serious repercussions of his Via Media. The intention is to maintain and further Wendt’s philosophical objectives in the scientific study of “the social” while overcoming the limitations inherent in his presentation of scientific realism, and thus clarifying these vital theoretical issues for our discipline.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: To understand the role of ideas in the security arena, it is important to understand when and how norms are institutionalized. Research in this area has generally focused on practical, evolutionary approaches (Axelrod 1986; Florini 1996) or solutions to the problem of measuring norm development (Goetz and Diehl 1992; Legro 1997). Yet few studies attempt to systematically explore the process of norm generation and propagation. As a result, scholars know little about the conditions under which proposed norms come to fruition. Since the security arena has historically been considered the ?toughest case? for normative justifications, this paper examines the process of norm adoption in this sphere. It is primarily concerned with answering these questions: Through what processes do norms prohibiting the use of a weapon successfully advance? When do new weapons norms fail to resonate? Why do states successfully institutionalize norms against some weapons but not others? This paper attempts to utilize insights from the constructivist and discursive framing literatures to theorize the mechanism(s) by which anti-weapons norms will be accepted by the international community and instances in which the norms will fail to take hold. It suggests that normative heresthetics, adapted from Riker?s theory of forced choices (and the public awareness and accountability campaigns that underpin them), predict the international community?s adoption or rejection of a new norm. Specifically, the paper proposes that suggestions to limit or restrict the usage of certain weapons will fail to resonate strongly enough with the international community to become accepted, while efforts to totally prohibit a weapon will succeed.