Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines various strategies commanded under the WTO DS system. Because of the strong legal characteristics of the WTO DS system, states' optimal strategies has changed considerably as compared with those under the GATT system.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The paper advances the literature on Europe as a foreign economic actor by comparing its performance to that of the USA. It responds to concerns that the European multi-level decision-making structures are a major obstacle for an efficient conduct of international trade governance. In order to do so, it conducts a quantitative analysis of WTO data on trade disputes and concludes with a cautiously optimistic picture. The EU's strength lies in its overall orientation towards free trade and its legal mechanisms, which are an effective means against the establishment of a fortress Europe. At the same time, however, those very same institutional mechanisms make the EU inflexible when it comes to adapting its legislation to international legal provisions that are opposed by either a blocking minority of member states or well vested interests. On balance, in terms of its readiness to comply with international trade law, the EU looks like a basically inward-looking, but nevertheless constructive building block on the road towards a liberal international trade order.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In March 2004 U.S. filed the WTO complaint on its dispute regarding to China?s tax refund policy for integrated circuits. The U.S. case was the first against China since it joined the WTO in December 2001. Since its entry into WTO, the enforcement of China?s accession commitment has been a great concern to many parties. In another word, the controversy over China?s membership has continued. Therefore, the careful examination of the emergence, evolution and final resolution of this first dispute case can provide us a better understanding of China?s institutional practice and learning. The research question I ask is that whether the WTO membership transformed, if yes then how, the domestic trade politics in China and its trade partners and whether interest groups lobbying is able to play a more visible role in the process of domestic mobilization now. This will be a case study under the broad theoretical hypothesis that whether international institutions can independently shape/alter state behaviors?U.S. exports of integrated circuits to China were subject to a 17% value-added tax(VAT). However, China has taxed domestic products significantly less, by allowing firms producing integrated circuits in China to obtain a partial refund of the VAT. China also allowed for a partial refund of VAT paid on integrated circuits designed in China but manufactured abroad. Clearly, this was the measure taken by Chinese government in order to promote its infant semiconductor sector. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) was the leading domestic actor in U.S. against this unfair trade practice. In this empirical research, I am going to study on the one hand the domestic coalition built and led by SIA through the Congress and according policy response of the U.S. government and on the other hand, the domestic preference formation and policy reaction within China. In particular, I will pay close attention to the comparison between different domestic institutions and the process of coalition-building and consensus-building in two countries.More importantly, through the comparison of domestic trade politics regarding to this particular case in the U.S. and China, it will help explain the variation of domestic institutions and the formation of domestic actors? preferences within two different regime types. This empirical study, therefore, will shed lights on a deep understanding of the trade politics of transitional economies and their interaction between these new entrants and their "senior" counterparts at important international economic institutions like WTO.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since 1995 Japan has been taking a very proactive role in using WTO law to challenge its dominant trade partners, the United States. But its emphasis on a rule-based approach is not only relegated to the United States. In fact, it promises also to spill over into trade disputes with key partners in Asia where, for historical, reasons Japan has had trouble taking confrontational stances. This is particularly true for the case for China, which is widely perceived as the rising economic power that poses a direct challenge to Japan across a number of critical and sensitive economic issues. This paper focuses specifically on the interplay between WTO law and politics as Japan seeks to deal with China across a number of trade issues and disputes.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines how the World Trade Organization (WTO) affects the trade policies of signatories. The paper concentrates on one of the 'Big Four' members of the WTO – the European Union (EU). Specifically, we examine the impact of WTO regulations on EU antidumping (AD) regulation and consequently, on the choices and actions of EU trade policy makers and on the strategies of firms engaged in AD actions. As the dramatic anti-globalization riots in Seattle, Gothenburg, Genoa and Washington show, the WTO has become a focus for protests about the nature of 'governance' in the international economy. There is concern about the degree to which WTO agreements impinge on national sovereignty by proscribing certain types of government regulation. Recognition of this risk can be found in the truncated nature of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). MFN is a cornerstone of the multilateral system: in its original GATT formulation, it proscribes discrimination among trading partners. However, the GATS MFN clause is much more conditional: states offer schedules of their liberalising measures and the degree of MFN treatment they are prepared to offer. 'Governments wanted the option of adopting a more gradual and conditioned approach to opening up their markets, by making national treatment something to be granted, denied or qualified, depending on the sector and signatory concerned' (Low and Mattoo, 1998, p. 4). Relatively little work has been done on whether goods trade regulation under GATT constrains states in similar ways, though some states, such as Canada, have suggested that GATT rules can influence national trade policymaking (DFAIT, 2002). Some current international business and international political economy literature expresses reservations about the WTO as a supranational organization (Rugman and Verbeke 1998; Rugman 2000), but we currently face a dearth of empirical work to assess the precise reach of WTO regulation. Moreover, to the extent that this question is addressed, the literature looks at the developing states and frames the issue as one of cost, rather than policymaking constraints (Hoekman, 2002). One way to assess the real impact of the WTO is to look at its influence on a powerful member of the international trading system – and to look at that impact in goods trade. This would provide the stiffest test for those seeking to demonstrate the impact of the WTO. That is the purpose of this paper. We aim to interrogate the WTO and European Commission Trade Directorate data sets on AD negotiations (annual reports are produced by both organisations) with the aim of obtaining first, an absolute number of AD investigations; second, a breakdown by industrial sector; and third, evidence of the change over time in the number and target of AD action. In addition, we will undertake a set of interviews with key EU and WTO officials to substantiate and further develop our initial findings. In pursuing this methodology we are looking for the following: first, changes in industry profile for AD action; and second, a European Commission change of approach in the selection of trade instruments. On the first point, we are interested in assessing the changing industry profile of AD action to see if it is associated with changing EU trade strategy and to assess the implications for the competitive environment and industry dynamics. On the second point, a firm or industry association petitions the EU for action in response to perceived predatory or anticompetitive behaviour by competitors. The EU first takes the decision whether to act or not. If action is chosen, the Commission then selects the policy instrument or method for action. Our question is: 'in recent years, have these options been constrained in any way by WTO regulation?' Put another way, do we notice any change, pre and post-WTO, in the way in which the EU AD regime operates?