Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Party system development and state formation are distinct historical processes that are usefully studied in conjunction. The evolution of Colombia's state institutions - particularly its armed forces - provides a useful avenue for conceptualizing the relationship between parties and states in developing countries. Based on primary archival sources, this paper situates the institutional design of the Colombian Army and National Police, which took place during a period of Conservative Party dominance (1880-1920), in the context of partisan struggle for control of the national territory - an open question at the time, and still today. The type of state institutions that party-based elites design responds to conjunctural strategic needs, but these choices have significant path-dependent effects on subsequent political development. Colombia offers one such example: in this case, the creation of decentralized armed forces allowed for greater political manipulation by regional and local elites, key players in the struggle for partisan dominance. If we measure state capacity by the degree of centralization, this design was a choice in favor of a weak state. However, if we view state capacity in the context of conflict between parties, then a weak state may have actually made for a strong, or at least stable, regime. To understand the formation of weak states, the paper argues, we must reconceptualize the design of state institutions as a purposive move in an ongoing process of strategic interaction among party-based elites.