Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: One of the theoretical landmarks of environmental sociology is Dunlap and Catton’s distinction between the “Human Exceptionalist Paradigm” and the “New Environmental Paradigm.” The HEP describes cultural values that emphasize the separation of society from nature. This perspective has dominated classical and contemporary sociology, leading sociologists to study human social action as though environmental factors were irrelevant. Instead, the NEP emphasizes that social action occurs within ecosystem processes and limits. The implication is that environmental variables become significant for sociological analysis. Dunlap and Catton claim that environmental sociology is defined by its willingness to embrace the NEP. Furthermore, the attempt to incorporate nature as a significant presence has been taken up by many sociologists. However, the claim that the HEP has limited consideration of the environment within the sociological tradition is problematic. Furthermore, their assertion that environmental sociologists should adopt an NEP standpoint has not materialized. “Exceptionalist” environmental sociologies abound within the subdiscipline. In this context, the HEP-NEP distinction may be read as a discursive device that works to “police the boundaries” of the subdiscipline. It may limit our appreciation of the richness of work that adopts a more “social” conception of the environment. Through an examination of the “Exceptionalist” work of the classical tradition and environmental constructionism, I will argue that a broader conception of “environmental sociology” is more useful, especially as a model for how nature may achieve a greater presence within the sociological “mainstream.”