Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: First, with respect to the fate of single-party regimes worldwide during the Third Wave, I explore the question of whether or not the empirical record provides evidence that the distinction that has been drawn among “closed,” “hegemonic electoral,” and “competitive” authoritarian regimes is an analytically useful one. The paper suggests that the distinctions that have been drawn between competitive, hegemonic, and closed authoritarian dictatorships *are* useful ones. Competitive authoritarian single-party regimes appear more likely to metamorphose than hegemonic regimes, which are in turn more likely to undergo transformation than are closed regimes. Moreover, when competitive authoritarian regimes metamorphose, transitions are overwhelmingly likely to lead in a democratizing direction (while only 20% of hegemonic regimes that transitioned democratized, and no closed regime democratized). Finally, those single-party regimes that commenced democratization from a competitive footing appeared to do better in terms of political rights and civil liberties going forward than did single party regimes that democratized from a hegemonic stance.

Second, given that competitive authoritarian single-party regimes are those most likely to make democratizing transitions, I turn to the question of when and how single-party regimes become competitive authoritarian. Levitsky & Way (2002, 60-61) identify three paths through which competitive authoritarian regimes emerge. The first is through the “decay of a democratic regime.” None of the instances of competitive single-party authoritarianism during the Third Wave evolved in this manner. The second is through “the collapse of an authoritarian regime, followed by the emergence of a new, competitive authoritarian regime.” This was the path that was taken in the Yugoslavian and Nicaraguan cases. The third is through “the decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime.” This was the path taken by the majority of the single-party regimes that inhabited the competitive authoritarian “neighborhood” during the Third Wave.

Here, however, a refinement of L&W’s typology is in order (at least for single-party regimes). When these five remaining cases are examined, they manifest a blunt distinction between those that emerged from the ABRUPT decay of full-blown authoritarian regimes (Kenya and Gabon), where a single year can be identified as the pivotal political turning point, and those that emerged from the GRADUAL decay of full-blown authoritarian regimes (Mexico, Senegal and Taiwan), where the processes by which executive and legislative elections became substantially more meaningful spanned a decade or more in time.

What explains the latter, more gradual, incremental type of movement toward competitive authoritarian rule? Here the paper offers a few tentative observations based on a first (and not yet complete) foray into the qualitative literature on political development in Mexico, Senegal and Taiwan during the years when they were moving toward competitive authoritarianism. Two factors the cases seem to share in common appear to be especially fruitful avenues for further investigation with respect to understanding why these countries evolved into competitive authoritarian single-party regimes. First, in each case, successions took place at the head of ruling parties in which incumbent presidents expressly designated their successors; these had repercussions in terms of intra-party dynamics that pushed reform and opening along. Second, in each case there is evidence that, at the highest levels of ruling party leadership, the perception existed that political concessions in local and national legislative arenas held the key to ruling parties’ legitimacy and retention of the all-important presidential post. This perception seems related in part to the fact of incumbent leaders expressly and autocratically choosing their successors, but this is not the only relevant factor here.