Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper investigates economic interdependence and alliance reliability. I explain how international trade affects the violation of alliance commitments in crises. Trade has both an endogenous and exogenous nature. Trade flows are affected by security concerns, while trade generates domestic political cleavages that constrain governmental policy choices. I interpret trade sensitivity and vulnerability focusing on governmental incentives, the general interest and special interest models. With statistical methods, I examine whether trade affected by security concerns generates domestic political cleavages in the period 1816-1944 that, in turn, affect alliance violations. The results do not sufficiently answer the research question. However, the results do provide a very clear policy implication. A state’s vulnerability to trade decreases its rate of treaty violation. Controlling bilateral trade and establishing preferential trade agreements are helpful for constraining alliance commitment violations. Though there is a lack of economic data on trade for the period under examination, imputation techniques allow us to arrive at robust results. This paper opens up a new interesting research area on the interaction between trade and security.