Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The United States has adopted a number of measures to ensure that their citizens are not subject to the International Criminal Court. Most significantly, the Bush administration has used economic sanctions such as the termination of economic and military aid in order to coerce states to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIA). These agreements exempt Americans from prosecution by the ICC. In many cases, this tactic has proven effective. Over ninety states have signed such agreements. However, the decision by many Latin American and small Caribbean states to refuse to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States in the face of intense opposition from the United States is remarkable.
This paper first addresses why these states have refused to sign an agreement in the face of intense pressure. International Relations theory has difficulty accounting for states that act in ways that are contrary to their material interests. Despite what the major theories of International Relations would tell us to expect, these states make these choices because they are seeking more abstract goals. Prestige is one of those goals and, in the case of the International Criminal Court examined in this paper, explains why some small Caribbean states were willing to sacrifice their immediate security and economic objectives to support the Court.
Second, this paper examines whether continued pressure by the United States in the form of aid termination is worth the costs it is imposing on other American foreign policy goals. In particular, the potential harm to US anti-narcotic efforts, democracy goals, and overall security is substantial.