Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper will discuss the interconnections between dominant scientific strands in Western thought and claims to objectivity in what I refer to as "legal-economic theory". The current dominant strand of legal economic theory is what is commonly referred to as law and economics (but more appropriately labled "law and neoclassical economics"). The law and neoclassical economics movement, as an extension of the neoclassical economics movement, gained its claim to objectivity based on the philosophical premises of logical positivism and the analytic philosophy movement generally. Those philosophical movements in turn were directly affected by Einstein's theories of relativity. In understanding the claim of objectivity in the law and neoclassical economics movement and why that claim can no longer be sustained (in part due to new conceptions of science and developments in philosophy) it is crucial that legal-academics have a fuller understanding of developments in science and how they shape our general cultural ethos. This paper will be an attempt at a brief sketch. The paper is derivative of a larger project I am in the process of completing that engages the same type of analysis covering the historical trajectory of legal-economic theory in American intellectual thought. The book, under the same title as the paper, will be published by Duke University Press.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Based on ethnographic study of economic departments in Israel and in-depth interviews with more than 30 academic economists, this article examines the ways in which observations of economic phenomena bear upon model-building activities, and how they are assimilated to the mathematical medium of economics. Rather than comparing the models to ostensible realities and finding them unrealistic, we trace the mediations between the relative purity and abstraction of mathematical models and the relatively messier observations of economic reality. Thus, this article does not discuss how accurately formal models represent the real economy, but rather asks how the neoclassical economists themselves make the connection between their models and economic realities. We show that the economic model is expected by economists to simplify reality and isolate one mechanism that may explain an observed phenomenon. The audience of the model does not expect to accept the suggested mechanism as the cause of the phenomenon, but rather as a proposal of a plausible economic force. Comprehending how economists construct the relations between reality and their models would contribute to the understanding of scientific cultures, and especially to deductive practices that have rarely been studied. This study aspires to bridge the incommensurability gap between mainstream neoclassical economics on the one hand, and common approaches in sociology and other social sciences on the other. Our efforts might be relevant for the discussion of methodology in social sciences in general and yield more apposite criticism of mainstream economics in particular.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since 1979, the National Science Foundation has sponsored a biennial survey to assess public attitudes toward and understanding of science and technology. In an effort to reduce the length of the survey with hopes of improving response rates, this study developed a short form for the Factual Knowledge of Science (FKS) scale, one of the primary measures included in the survey. The FKS scale includes 18 questions designed to measure respondents’ knowledge of scientific concepts. Because the FKS scale is used for longitudinal comparisons, a primary concern was that the short form should perform in the same manner as the long form and retain as much information as possible. Data from the 1997, 1999, and 2001 surveys were used to develop and validate the short form. First, the knowledge questions were classified into eight content areas: life science, evolution, geology/geography, astronomy, radioactivity, physics, and chemistry. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the items form a single factor. Item response theory analyses were conducted to evaluate the difficulty and discrimination of each item. Items for the short form were selected to represent all eight content areas and maintain the distribution of difficulty levels included on the long form. Discrimination parameters were also used in the selection of items. The resulting short form contained 11 items, had a correlation of .95 with the long form, and accounted for 90 percent of its variance. Cronbach’s alpha was nearly identical for the two forms. Group comparisons revealed that the short form detected the same patterns of differences between respondents based on gender, age, education level, and background in math and science as the long form. The results of this study support the reliability and validity of the short form, suggesting its suitability as an alternative to the current scale.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: How has the US state used international law to reshape global production and consumption of genetically modified foods? This paper traces the domestic evolution of U.S. intellectual property rights' law from 1988-1994 to show how it serves as the foundation for US efforts to expand international protection for Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) as a way to use the 'life sciences industry' as a fundamental resource. By deepening the legalization of global trade, these efforts serve to expand the US role as a hegemonic state. The US domestic IPR regime was exported into the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both processes extend U.S. structural power by embedding its scientific and technological 'comparative advantage' into the rules promulgated by the WTO. The paper thus challenges scholars to problematize the role of international law as a non-neutral factor in world affairs.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Economic analysis plays a major role in the American legal discourse, while its position in the German-speaking legal debate remains comparatively limited. In Germany and Austria, a widespread aversion against law and economics can be observed among legal scholars. This article advances an explanation for this divergence on the basis of two main factors: First, American legal realism enjoyed great success, whereas the German free-law movement failed to leave a lasting impression. While legal realism transformed American legal thought and opened up the discourse to policy arguments, the predominant German legal theory emphasizes the internal coherence of the legal system, and assigns only a limited role to external elements. Second, the different philosophical roots and attitude towards and utilitarianism and consequentionalist thinking in general can explain why law and economics takes a prominent position in the US legal academia.